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FAMILY LAW-THE SUBSTANTIAL RELATIONSHIP TEST: THE PU
TATIVE FATHER GAINS STANDING TO REBUT THE PRESUMPTION OF
LEGITIMACY-C. C. v. A.B.
INTRODUCTION

"The presumption of legitimacy of a child born during marriage
is one of the strongest presumptions known to law."1 Many courts
grant the mother or her husband a cause of action to rebut the pre
sumption of legitimacy which attaches to a child whose mother is mar
ried. 2 The putative,3 or biological father, is not always as fortunate. 4
In 1989, the United States Supreme Court, in a plurality decision,
held that the conclusive presumption of legitimacy which attaches to a
child born to a married woman was constitutional. s Consequently, the
Court denied standing to a putative father because he had no funda
mental right to assert paternity.6 However, in 1990, in a case with
similar facts, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court granted
1. &pree v. Guillory, 753 S.W.2d 722, 724 (Tex. App. 1988). In order to minimize
the stigma of illegitimacy of a child born out of wedlock, the common law developed a
presumption that a child born to a married woman was the child of the marriage. How
ever, this presumption could be rebutted by proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the hus
band could not have been the father. See HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC
RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES § 4.1, at 151 (2d ed. 1988); see also Tiana M. Hin
nant, Note, Lovers' Triangle Turns Bermuda Triangle: The Natural Father's Right to Re
but the Marital Presumption, 25 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 617 (1990).
2. Cook v. Perron, 427 So. 2d 499 (La. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 433 So. 2d 1054 (La.
1983); Serafin v. Serafin, 258 N.W.2d 461 (Mich. 1977) (husband granted standing to rebut
presumption of legitimacy of the child); Davis v. Houston, 734 S.W.2d 210 (Tex. App.
1987) (wife granted standing to challenge husband's paternity); UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT
§ 6(a)(1)-(2), 9B U.L.A. 302 (1987).
3. A "putative father" is defined as "[t]he alleged or reputed father of a child born
out of wedlock." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1237 (6th ed. 1990).
4. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989); see also Cline v. Drew, 735 S.W.2d
232 (Tenn. App. 1987) (denying standing to putative father of child born during wedlock to
assert visitation rights and to change the child's name); P.B.C. v. D.H., 483 N.E.2d 1094
(Mass. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1058 (1986) (denying standing to putative father to
rebut the marital presumption of legitimacy).
5. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (Scalia, J., wrote for the plurality
joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and, in all but note 6, by O'Connor & Kennedy, n. Id. at 113
32. O'Connor, J., wrote a concurring opinion in which Kennedy, J., joined. Id. at 132.
Stevens, J., wrote a concurring opinion. Id. at 132~36. Brennan, J., dissented, joined by
Marshall & Blackmun, n. Id. at 136-57. White, J., dissented, joined by Brennan, J. Id. at
157-63).
6. [d. at 113-32.
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standing to the putative father'? Not only was he allowed to rebut the
marital presumption of legitimacy, but he was allowed to do so by
meeting a lower evidentiary standard than previously existed under
Massachusetts law. 8
The purpose of this Note is to show that the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court in C C v. A.B. 9 took a realistic look at the
problem that arises when a putative father asserts paternity, and devel
oped a test which balances the interests of the relevant parties with
minimal intrusion. Section I describes the historical background of
the marital presumption of legitimacy. Section II discusses the
Supreme Court decision in Michael H. v. Gerald D., 10 which denied
that a putative father had a fundamental right to rebut the marital
presumption of legitimacy. Section III examines C. C. v. A.B., 11 in
which the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court granted standing to
the putative father to rebut the marital presumption of legitimacy.
Section IV analyzes the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's sub
stantial relationship test, which grants the putative father standing in a
preliminary hearing to rebut the presumption of legitimacy. Section
IV further discusses whether this new standard accomplishes its pur
ported purpose: to balance the state's dual interests in legitimizing
children and protecting the marital family from intrusion against the
putative father's interest in maintaining a relationship with his child.
Section IV concludes that the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
correctly acknowledged the rights of putative fathers who desire to
maintain that relationship without being encumbered by burdensome
standards.
I.

THE STATE'S INTEREST IN MAINTAINING THE PRESUMPTION
OF LEGITIMACY

The common law created the marital presumption of legitimacy.
Primarily, two factors motivated its adoption. 12 First, the harsh treat
ment of illegitimate children motivated the state to avoid attaching
illegitimate status to children. 13 Second, the lack of a scientifically re
7. C.C. v. A.B., 550 N.E.2d 365 (Mass. 1990).
8. Id. at 370.
9. Id. at 365.
10. 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
11. 550 N.E.2d 365 (Mass. 1990).
12. Susan J. Barnes, Note, The Law's Strongest Presumption Collides with Mankind's
Strongest Bond: A Putative Father's Right to Establish His Relationship to His Child, 8 W.
NEW ENG. L. REV. 229, 239 (1986).
13. Id.; see C C, 550 N.E.2d at 369. Justice Nolan stated that the origin and pur
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liable method of determining paternity was a logical reason for
presuming the husband's paternity.14 The state's interest in the pro
tection of children and the marital family prompted the adoption of
the presumption, but it provided no relief for the putative father. A
brief survey of the presumption's creation provides a backdrop against
which the current developments in the status of the putative father can
be examined.
A.

Historical Background: The Need for a Presumption of
Legitimacy

The presumption of legitimacy had its roots in common law. An
illegitimate child was labelled filius nullius, the "son of nobody."ls
Under the English common law, which the American courts
adopted,16 the parents were not obligated to support their childP
Furthermore, an illegitimate child had no rights of inheritance from
either parent. 1S
The common law thus condemned the illegitimate child to punish
the parents' actions. 19 The hardship placed on the illegitimate child
formed the basis for the presumption of legitimacy.2o The law could
minimize the number of illegitimate children by preventing couples
from "bastardizing" their offspring.21 In order to mitigate these harsh
burdens on illegitimate children, the common law created a strict ap
plication of the presumption "that a child born in lawful wedlock is
legitimate."22
At its inception, this marital presumption, called Lord Manspose of the marital presumption was to legitimize a child so as to avoid "imposing harsh
results on the child as punishment of the parents' actions." Id.
14. Barnes, supra note 12, at 239 (citing HARRY D. KRAUSE, ILLEGITIMACY: LAW
AND SOCIAL POLICY 123 (1971».
IS. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 629 (6th ed. 1990); see also e.e., 550 N.E.2d at 368
(citing Cooley v. Dewey, 21 Mass. (4 Pick.) 93, 94 (1826»; I WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *459; Hinnant, supra note I, at 623.
16. e.e., 550 N.E.2d at 368.
17. Id. (citing Ruttinger v. Temple, 4 Best & Smith's Rep. 491 (Q.B. 1863». The
Massachusetts court in Somerset v. Dighton, 12 Mass. 383, 387 (1815) created a duty of a
mother to care for her child. e. e., 550 N.E.2d at 369 n.4. Massachusetts statutes dating
back to 1668 required a man to support his illegitimate child. Id. The father's duty to
support his child did not improve his rights.
18. e.e., 550 N.E.2d at 369 (citing Kent v. Barker, 68 Mass. (2 Gray) 535, 536
(1854»; CLARK, supra note I, § 4.2, at 155-61.
19. e.e., 550 N.E.2d at 369; see also Barnes, supra note 12, at 238.
20. Barnes, supra note 12, at 238-39 (citing CLARK, supra note I, § 4.1, at ISO-55;
KRAUSE, supra note 14, at 1-7).
21. Id. (citations omitted).
22. e.e., 550 N.E.2d at 369 (citing Phillips v. Allen, 84 Mass. (2 Allen) 453, 454
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field's Rule,23 made rebutting the presumption of legitimacy more dif
ficult. This rule provided that "where the legitimacy of a child born in
lawful wedlock is in issue, in the absence of statutory authority neither
the husband nor the wife may testify as to nonaccess between them."24
The result of this rule was that a child conceived by a married woman
was presumed to be a child of the mother's marriage. This presump
tion was conc1usive25 and applied whether the husband was actually
the child's biological father,26 whether the husband and wife were di
vorced when the child was bom,27 whether a subsequent divorce oc
(1861)); see supra ~otes 13-14 and accompanying text for the factors motivating the com
mon law's adoption of the presumption of legitimacy.
23. Hinnant, supra note 1, at 623. According to Lord Mansfield's Rule, on the
grounds of decency, morality, and public opinion, a husband or wife is incompetent to
testify as to the husband's non-access. (Non-access is the "[a]bsence of opportunities for
sexual intercourse between husband and wife; or the absence of such intercourse."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1050 (6th ed. 1990). It is used by an alleged father as a de
fense in paternity cases. Id.). Such evidence would tend to show that a child conceived
during a marriage is illegitimate. Goodright v. Moss, 98 Eng. Rep. 1257, 1258 (1777).
24. c.c., 550 N.E.2d at 371. Lord Mansfield's Rule provided "that where the legiti
macy of a child born in lawful wedlock is in issue, in the absence of statutory authority
neither the husband nor the wife may testify as to nonaccess between them." Sayles v.
Sayles, 80 N.E.2d 21, 22 (Mass. 1948) (quoting Taylor v. Whittier, 138 N.E. 6, 7 (Mass.
1922)). Because statutes and cases in Massachusetts have allowed testimony in contraven
tion of the rule, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court abrogated Lord Mansfield's
Rule and declared that "a wife and a husband are no longer incompetent ... to testify as to
nonaccess or impotence during the time relevant to conception." c.c., 550 N.E.2d at 371.
25. c.c., 550 N.E.2d at 369 (citing Phillips v. Allen, 84 Mass. (2 Allen) 453, 454
(1861)). The conclusive presumption was later modified to allow rebuttal by evidence be
yond a reasonable doubt that the husband could not have been the father. Id.
The conditions to be proven are that: "(I) the husband had no access to the wife
during the time of possible conception; (2) the husband was impotent; or (3) a properly
conducted blood grouping test, administered by a qualified expert, definitively excludes the
husband as a father." In re J.S.V., 524 N.E.2d 826, 827-28 (Mass. 1988) (denying standing
to a putative father to adjudicate paternity in the context of a proceeding to dispense with
the need for parental consent to adoption; no facts being offered to overcome the presump
tion of legitimacy).
26. Barnes, supra note 12, at 239 (citing P.B.C. v. D.H., 483 N.E.2d 1094 (Mass.
1985) (refusing to inquire into actual biological paternity of the child through blood tests),
cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1058 (1986)); Cook V. Perron, 427 So. 2d 499 (La. Ct. App. 1983)
(precluding husband from denying paternity notwithstanding blood tests showing conclu
sive evidence that he could not be the biological father); People V. Thompson, 152 Cal.
Rptr. 478 (1979) (deeming husband legal father and responsible for support of wife's child
conceived while husband and wife were cohabiting); Hess v. Whitsitt, 65 Cal. Rptr. 45
(1967) (holding white husband to be the father although his white wife gave birth to a
mixed race child); see also Hinnant, supra note 1, at 624.
27. Barnes, supra note 12, at 239 (citing P.B.C., 483 N.E.2d at 1096). See also
Cartee V. Carswell, 425 So. 2d 204 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (presuming a child conceived
during marriage but born after divorce is legitimate and the ex-husband is the father);
Hinnant, supra note 1, at 624 (citation omitted).
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curred,28 or whether the husband acknowledged or had a relationship
with the child. 29
B.

Massachusetts Application of the Presumption of Legitimacy

Massachusetts law also presumed that the husband was the father
of a child conceived by or born to his wife. 30 The presumption of
legitimacy operated automatically without formal proceedings to es
tablish paternity.3! The husband was responsible for the child's sup
port and entitled to a constitutionally protected parent-child
relationship.32 Conversely, the presumption of legitimacy created dif
ficulty for a putative father who wished to prove paternity of a married
woman's child in order to assert parental rights such as visitation. 33
In Massachusetts, prior to C C v. A.B., 34 a putative father was either
28. Barnes, supra note 12, at 239 (citing P.B. C, 483 N.E.2d at 1096); Michelle W. v.
Ronald W., 703 P.2d 88 (Cal. 1985) (holding that the presumption of legitimacy is not
overcome even if the mother remarried after divorce), appeal dismissed, 474 U.S. 1043
(1986); see also Hinnant, supra note 1, at 624-25.
29. Barnes, supra note 12, at 239 (citing Lirette v. Lirette, 430 So. 2d 1150 (La. Ct.
App. 1983) (presuming former husband to be the father of a child born to his ex-wife even
though she committed adultery and concealed her pregnancy from him)); see also Hinnant,
supra note 1, at 625.
30. P.B.C. v. D.H., 483 N.E.2d 1094 (Mass. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1058
(1986). In P.B.C, the mother, D.H., had filed for divorce in May, 1981. Id. at 1096. A
final judgment of divorce was entered on Dec. 8, 1981, and became final on June 9, 1982.
Id. The child was born the next day. Id. Since birth, the child lived with the mother and
never with the putative father; nor did the mother allow the putative father access to the
child. Id. The mother and her former husband remarried on September 12, 1983. Id. The
child's birth certificate listed the husband as the father. Id. In this case, the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court extended the presumption of legitimacy from a child born to a
married woman to one conceived by a married woman. Id. The court held that "in the
circumstances of this case" it would not recognize in a putative father the common law
right to a paternity adjudication. Id. at 1097. The court continued to recognize that "ordi
narily an unwed father has a legally protectable interest in his children, and that he is
entitled to establish that he is their natural father." Id. The facts of this case coupled with
the state's interest in affording legitimacy to children and protection of the marital family
outweighed the putative father's interest. Id. The court used the lack of a developed sub
stantial relationship between putative father and child as support for the denial of standing.
Id. For a discussion of how P.B.C relates to paternity and constitutional law, see Barnes,
supra note 12; see also Valerie S. Meiners, Comment, The Child With Two Fathers: Updat
ing the Wisdom of Solomon, 46 LA. L. REV. 1211, 1223-24 (1986).
31. Barnes, supra note 12, at 237-38 (citations omitted).
32. Id. at 238; see also Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
33. Barnes, supra note 12, at 236; see also Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110
(1989) (holding that a putative father has no standing to rebut the presumption of legiti
macy; this denial of standing is neither a violation of the equal protection nor due process
clauses).
34. 550 N.E.2d 365 (Mass. 1990).
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foreclosed from asserting a cause oflaction to adjudicate paternity,3S or
allowed to rebut the presumption of legitimacy only by proof beyond a
reasonable doubt. 36 The husband was, therefore, afforded rights
superior to those of the putative father. 37
Massachusetts upheld the presumption of legitimacy to preserve
three interests: (1) to make children legitimate wherever possible;38
(2) to remove the disadvantage placed on illegitimate children 39 as
well as to ensure the care and support of the child;40 and (3) to protect
traditional family units.41 The operation of the presumption of
legitimacy
affords legitimacy to the greatest number of children through its
preference that paternity reside in married rather than unmarried
men. It protects traditional family units by erecting barriers to an
unmarried, putative father's ability to disrupt an intact family unit
through his attempts to prove that he is the father of a child con
ceived or born during the marriage. Finally, the state classification
system ensures the care and support of children by guaranteeing
that at least one man will be presumed to be the legal father of a
child. 42

The state's interests did not recognize the rights of a putative fa
ther to establish and maintain a relationship with his child because his
interest was one which the law had not historically recognized. 43
When a putative father asserted paternity, his interests clashed with
those of the state. 44 However, a different situation exists where a puta
tive father has established a substantial relationship with the child. 4s
35. P.B.C. v. D.H., 483 N.E.2d 1094 (Mass. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1058
(1986). For a discussion of P.D.C., see supra note 30.
36. R.R.K. v. S.G.P., 507 N.E.2d 736 (Mass. 1987).
37. Barnes, supra note 12, at 236-37.
38. c.c., 550 N.E.2d at 370; see also Barnes, supra note 12, at 237.
39. c.c., 550 N.E.2d at 370.
40. Barnes, supra note 12, at 237 (citing P.B.C. v. D.H., 483 N.E.2d 1094, 1096,
1099 (Mass. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1058 (1986».
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. c.c., 550 N.E.2d at 370.
44. [d.
45. Id. This substantial relationship mitigates the clash between the putative father's
and the state's interests. The United States Supreme Court began to recognize a constitu
tionally protected interest when such a relationship existed between a putative father and
an out of wedlock child.
In Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983), the Supreme Court held that an unmar
ried father who had neither a developed relationship with his child nor admitted his pater
nity through New York's putative father registry had no claim that his due process rights
had been violated because he was not notified of the impending adoption of his child. Id. at
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Whether this substantial relationship gives rise to a protected interest
that will rebut the marital presumption of legitimacy remains a con
troversial issue that the United States Supreme Court and the Massa
chusetts Supreme Judicial Court addressed and answered differently.46
II.

MICHAEL

H. V. GERALD D.47

In 1989, in Michael H. v. Gerald D., a case filed by the putative
265. The Court reasoned that because the putative father had never established any custo
dial, personal or financial relationship with the child, the State could treat the mother and
putative father differently without violating the equal protection clause. Id. at 267-68. In
Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979), an unmarried father who had lived with his
children and their mother for four years and who visited with them frequently and was
granted visitation rights was given the opportunity to object to the children's adoption by
the mother and her husband. The Court held that the existence of a substantial father
children relationship and the admission by the father of his paternity did not bear a sub
stantial relationship to the state's proclaimed interest in promoting adoption of illegitimate
children. Id. at 393. The Court stated that this holding would be different in a case in
which the father had never acknowledged his children nor participated in their upbringing.
Id. at 392. In Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978), an unmarried father who had only
intermittent contacts with his child during a 12 year period was denied an opportunity to
object to the child's adoption by her mother and the mother's husband. The Court held
that the putative father's rights were outweighed by the full recognition of the family unit
and the best interests of the child. Id. at 255. In Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), an
unmarried father who lived intennittently with his children and their mother during an 18
year period was afforded protection under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The United States Supreme Court recognized the unwed father's interest in
retaining custody of his children. Id. at 652. For a discussion of the relationship among
these cases, see Meiners, supra note 30, at 1218-24; John J. Brogan, Due Process Rights of
Putative Fathers, II HUM. RTS. ANN. 199 (1984); Gregory F. Buckley, Comment, Lehr v.
Robertson: Putative Fathers Revisited, II OHIO N.U. L. REV. 385 (1984). See also Michael
H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 123-29 (1989). But see id. at 142-45 (Brennan, J., joined by
Marshall & Blackmun, JJ., dissenting), id. at 158-61 (White, J., joined by Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
46. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (denying a putative father
standing to rebut the marital presumption of legitimacy). But see C.C. v. A.B., 550 N.E.2d
365 (Mass. 1990) (granting a putative father who has established a substantial relationship
with his child standing to rebut the marital presumption).
47. 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (Scalia, J., wrote for the plurality joined by Rehnquist, C.J.,
and, in all but note 6, by O'Connor & Kennedy, JJ. Id. at 113-32. O'Connor, J., wrote a
concurring opinion in which Kennedy, J., joined. Id. at 132. Stevens, J., wrote a
concurring opinion. Id. at 132-36. Brennan, J., dissented, joined by Marshall &
Blackmun, JJ. Id. at 136-57. White, J., dissented joined by Brennan, J. Id. at 157-63).
For a further discussion of Michael H., see David L. Batty, Note, Michael H. v. Gerald D.:
The Constitutional Rights of Putative Fathers and a Proposalfor Reform, 31 B.C. L. REV.
1173 (1990); Te Jung Chang, Note, Survey: Women and California Law: Reverse Paternity
Suits, 18 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 611 (1988); Catherine A. Filhiol, Note, Michael H. v.
Gerald D: Upholding the Marital Presumption Against a Dual Paternity Claim, 50 LA. L.
REV. 1015 (1990); Hinnant, supra note 1; Recent Cases, The Supreme Court-Leading
Cases, Rights of Unwed Fathers, 103 HARV. L. REV. 137, 177-87 (1989); Gail A. Secor,
Note, Michael H. v. Gerald D.: Due Process and Equal Protection Rights of Unwed
Fathers, 17 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 759 (1990); Joan C. Sylvain, Note, Michael H. v.
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father, Michael, the United States Supreme Court addressed the issue
of a putative father's right to gain standing to assert paternity. A plu
rality of the Supreme Court held that a putative father's due process
rights were not violated by a conclusive presumption of legitimacy at
taching to a child whose mother was married at the time of the child's
birth and conception. Michael H. attempted to assert paternity and
visitation rights under a California statute48 which denied him stand
ing to rebut the presumption of legitimacy.49
A.

Facts

In Michael H., the married mother, Carole, and Michael, the pu
tative father, began an extramarital relationship in 1978 that resulted
in the birth of a child, Victoria, in May 1981. 50 Gerald, the husband,
was named on the birth certificate as the child's father and he treated
Gerald D.: The Presumption ofPaternity, 39 CATH. U. L. REV. 831 (1990); Gayle Wintjen,
Note, Make Room for Daddy: A Putative Father's Rights to His Children, 24 NEW ENG. L.
REV. 1059, 1066-69 (1990).
48. CAL. EVID. CODE ANN. § 621 (West Supp. 1991). The relevant provisions ofthe
statute are:
Child of the marriage; notice of motion for blood tests:
(a) Except as provided in subdivision (b), the issue of a wife cohabiting with her
husband, who is not impotent or sterile, is conclusively presumed to be a child of
the marriage.
(b) Notwithstanding subdivision (a), if the court finds that the conclusions of all
the experts, as disclosed by the evidence based upon blood tests performed pursu
ant to Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 890) of Division 7, are that the hus
band is not the father of the child, the question of paternity of the husband shall
be resolved accordingly.
(c) The notice of motion for blood tests under subdivision (b) may be filed not
later than two years from the child's date of birth, by the husband, or for purposes
of establishing paternity by the presumed father or the child through or by the
child's guardian ad litem.
(d) The notice of motion for blood tests under subdivision (b) may be filed by the
mother of the child not later than two years from the child's date of birth if the
child's biological father has filed an affidavit with the court acknowledging pater
nity of the child.
(e) Subdivision (b) shall not apply to any case coming within Section 7005 of the
Civil Code, or to any case in which the wife, with the consent of the husband,
conceived by means of a surgical procedure.
Id. (emphasis added to note language after Michael H. filed his complaint).
49. This section of the California code establishes a conclusive presumption that a
child born to "a wife cohabiting with her husband, who is not impotent or sterile" is the
child of the marriage. The presumption may only be rebutted by blood tests performed
within two years from the date of the child's birth. These blood tests must be performed by
motion of the husband or the wife after the natural father had filed an affidavit acknowledg
ing paternity. Id. § 621(a), (c), (d).
50. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 113-14 (Scalia, J., wrote for the plurality, joined by
Rehnquist, C.J., and, in all but note 6, by O'Connor & Kennedy, JJ.).
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the child as his.51 However, shortly after the delivery, Carole in
formed Michael that he might be the father. 52 At the end of October
1981, blood tests of Carole and Michael established a 98.07%
probability that Michael was Victoria's father.s3
Following unsuccessful attempts to visit Victoria while she was
living with Carole and Gerald, Michael filed a filiation action to estab
lish paternity and visitation rights. 54 In October 1984, Gerald inter
vened and moved for summary judgment asserting that under the
California Evidence Code section 621 there were no issues of triable
fact pertaining to Victoria's paternity because of the marital presump
tion of legitimacy. 55
Gerald's motion for summary judgment was granted in January
1985. The superior court found sufficient evidence to show that Car
ole and Gerald were cohabiting at the conception and birth of Victoria
and that Gerald was neither sterile nor impotent. The court denied
Victoria's and Michael's claims for continued visitation because of its
intrusion on the family. Michael challenged the constitutionality of
California Civil Code section 4601. 56 Michael asserted that his proce
dural and substantive due process rights had been violated by the su
Id.
Id.
53. Id. at 114. During Victoria's first three years, she remained in Carole's custody
but was exposed to a variety of living arrangements. Both Carole and Victoria lived for
various periods of time with Gerald, or Michael, or Scott, another man involved with Car
ole. When Carole and Victoria returned to California they resided with Scott. During that
spring and summer, Carole and Victoria visited Gerald in New York and Europe. In the
fall, they returned to California and Scott. Id.
54. Id. at 114-15. In March 1983, the court appointed an attorney and a guardian-ad
litem to represent Victoria's interests. Carole filed a motion for summary judgment in May
1983. Id. From March through July 1983, Carole and Victoria lived with Gerald. Carole
returned to California in August, rekindled her relationship with Michael, and removed the
summary judgment motion. Id. In April 1984, Carole and Michael signed, but never filed,
a stipulation that Michael was Victoria's father. Id. In May 1984, Michael and Victoria,
through her guardian ad litem, sought visitation rights for Michael pendente lite. Id. at
115. Following a psychological evaluation to determine whether visitation would be in
Victoria's best interests, the court granted Carole sole custody of Victoria and restricted
visitation privileges to Michael. Id. Carole and Gerald reconciled in June 1984 and con
tact between Michael and Victoria ceased. Id.
55. Id. at 115-16.
56. Id. CAL. CIV. CoDE ~NN. § 4601 (West 1983 & Supp. 1991) allows the court
the discretion to grant visitation rights to "any ... person having an interest in the welfare
of the child." Id. This statute provides:
Reasonable visitation rights shall be awarded to a parent unless it is shown that
such visitation would be detrimental to the best interests of the child. In the
discretion of the court, reasonable visitation rights may be granted to any other
person having an interest in the welfare of the child.
Id.
51.

52.
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perior court's application of section 62I.S7 However, the California
Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment of the superior court and up
held the constitutionality of section 621.58 After denial of rehearing
and review by the court of appeal and the California Supreme Court,
the United States Supreme Court, in February 1988, noted "probable
jurisdiction. "59

B.

The Plurality Decision

Michael's procedural due process claim asserted that the Califor
nia statute, section 621, which denied him standing to assert his pater
nity, violated his procedural due process rights. Justice Scalia, writing
for the plurality, rejected this challenge and stated that irrebuttable
presumptions are analyzed by "calling into question not the adequacy
of procedures but ... the adequacy of the 'fit' between the classifica
tion and the policy that the classification serves."60 Because standing
to rebut the presumption would not serve California's interest in pro
tecting "family integrity and privacy,"61 this challenge was denied.
Michael premised his assertion on the underlying assumption that
he had a constitutionally protected liberty interest in maintaining a
relationship with Victoria,62 and that the state's interest in protecting
the marriage of Gerald and Carole was "insufficient . . . to support
termination of that relationship. "63
The plurality rejected Michael's claim and held that he had no
fundamental liberty interest. The Court stated that the liberty interest
must not only be "fundamental," but also "be an interest traditionally
57. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 116. Victoria also raised a due process challenge "seek
ing to preserve her de facto relationship with Michael as well as with Gerald." Victoria's
challenge asserted that her equal protection rights had been violated because § 621 allows
the husband and mother, but not the child, to rebut the presumption of legitimacy. Victo
ria also asserted rights to visitation with Michael under § 4601. Id.
Section 621 differs from § 4601. Section 621 is the statute which creates the presump
tion of legitimacy. Section 4601 is the statute that provides a means for other parties to
assert visitation. See supra notes 48 and 56.
58. Id. (citing Michael H. v. Gerald D., 236 Cal. Rptr. 810 (Ct. App. 1987». The
court relied on California precedent in holding that when "an assertion of biological pater
nity is 'determined to be legally impossible' under § 621, visitation against the wishes of the
mother should be denied under § 4601." Id. (quoting Vincent B. v. Joan R., 179 Cal. Rptr.
9, 13 (1981), appeal dismissed, 459 U.S. 807 (1982».
59. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 116-17. Both Michael and Victoria raised due process
and equal protection challenges. However, Michael's equal protection challenge was not
reached because of his failure to raise it in prior proceedings. Id.
60. Id. at 121.
61. Id. at 120 (footnote omitted).
62. Id. at 119.
63. Id. at 121.
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protected by our society."64 A traditional interest was defined as
linked to the "conscience" of our society and reflecting society's un
derlying values. 65 The Court noted that cases upholding parental
rights rested not on the fundamental rights of the putative fathers, but
instead, on the "historic respect-indeed, sanctity would not be too
strong a term-traditionally accorded to the relationships that develop
within the unitary family. "66 The Constitution protects the relation
ships found in the unitary family and Michael's claim was an intrusion
on that entity. Michael's right to assert paternity and rebut the mari
tal presumption was not fundamental and, therefore, did not qualify as
a protected liberty interest. 67 The plurality stated: "Where. . . the
child is born into an extant marital family, the natu~al father's unique
opportunity conflicts with the similarly unique opportunity of the hus
band of the marriage; and it is not unconstitutional for the State to
give categorical preference to the latter."68 Consequently, the Court
denied Michael relief and upheld California's decision to protect the
unitary family from intrusion by denying the putative father standing
to rebut the marital presumption oflegitimacy.69
C.

The Dissent·

The dissenting Justices70 recognized that a putative father who
has developed a relationship with his child should not be summarily
denied standing to rebut the marital presumption.
Justice Brennan71 criticized the plurality's examination of a puta
64.

Id. at 122 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 122-23 (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934».
Id. at 123 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 124-25. In an attempt to justify the historic basis of his decision, Justice
Scalia examined the common law background which established the presumption of legiti
macy attaching to a child born to a married woman. He found no case law granting stand
ing to the natural father in these circumstances. Id.
68. Id. at 129.
69. Id. at 130-32. Justice Stevens concurred in the plurality's decision but used a
different rationale in addressing Michael's liberty interest. Justice Stevens did not want to
"foreclose the possibility that a constitutionally protected relationship between a natural
father and his child might exist in a case like this." Id. at 133 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Justice Stevens asserted that, on the basis of Michael's relationship with Victoria, he might
have a constitutional right to prove that visitation might be in the best interests of Victoria.
Id. However, Justice Stevens stated that Michael's rights had not been violated because he
had an opportunity to assert visitation under another statute. Id.
70. Justice Brennan wrote a dissenting opinion in which Justices Marshall and
Blackmun joined. Id. at 136-57. Justice White wrote a separate dissent in which Justice
Brennan joined. Id. at 157-63.
71. Id. at 136 (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by Marshall & Blackmun, JJ.). Justice
Brennan noted that five of the Justices remained open to the possibility that "a natural
65.
66.
67.
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tive father's interest. He stated that the proper question was not
whether the specific relationship between Victoria and Michael was a
traditionally protected family unit, but whether their relationship was
"close enough to the interests that we already have protected to be
deemed an aspect of 'liberty' as well" and, therefore, substantial
enough "to qualify as a liberty interest under our prior cases."72 After
examining prior case law,73 Justice Brennan determined that the bio
logical link of an unwed father coupled with a "substantial parent
child relationship" should afford a putative father a protected liberty
interest.74 Justice Brennan concluded that the state's interest was
"minute" in comparison with that of a putative father's attempt to
establish a relationship with his child. 75
Justice Brennan restated the issue to emphasize the procedural
flaws in the California scheme: "The question before us, therefore, is
whether California has an interest so powerful that it justifies granting
Michael no hearing before terminating his parental rights."76 Follow
ing an examination of the state's interest in preserving the privacy of
the marital family, Justice Brennan concluded that the state's interest
did not support a denial of Michael's and Victoria's interests in estab
lishing their parent-child relationship.77 This conclusion, Justice
Brennan stated, did not infringe on the issue of visitation rights which
may be denied as not being in Victoria's best interest. Instead, it
meant that Michael's right should not be terminated prior to an op
portunity to establish paternity.78
Justice White authored a separate, dissenting opinion. 79
Although Justice White agreed with Justice Brennan that Michael had
"a liberty interest that cannot be denied without due process of the
law,"80 he grounded his opinion on prior case law which recognized a
natural father's protected interest in establishing a relationship with
his child,8! and analyzed the impact of these cases on Michael's claim.
father might ... have a constitutionally protected interest in his relationship with a child
whose mother was married to, and cohabiting with, another man at the time of the child's
conception and birth." Id. (quoting Justice Stevens' concurring opinion).
72. Id. at 142.
73. Id. at 142-45. For a discussion of prior case law, see supra note 45.
74. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 142-43.
75. Id. at 148.
76. Id. at 154.
77. Id. at 155.
78. Id. at 156.
79. Id. at 157 (White, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan, J.).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 158-60; see supra note 45 for a discussion of the relevant cases. See also
infra text accompanying notes 129-40.
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Under this analysis Justice White concluded that because of Michael's
emotional relationship with Victoria, his contribution to her support,
and Carole's admission that he might be Victoria's father, Michael had
established a sufficient liberty interest to be protected by the Due Pro
cess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Consequently, under the
facts of this case, he concluded that Gerald's knowledge of Carole and
Michael's extramarital relationship negated the kind of intrusion the
state attempted to protect. 82
Although the plurality held that a putative father in Michael's
predicament did not have a fundamentally protected liberty interest in
maintaining a relationship with his child, the dissenting Justices dis
agreed. Unlike Justice Scalia who distinguished prior case law83 deal
ing with the rights of putative fathers, Justices Brennan and White
relied on that same prior case law to find that the existence of a sub
stantial relationship between the putative father and child was suffi
cient to overcome the state's fear of intrusion on the family caused by
an assertion of paternity.
In C C v. A. B. ,84 a case raising similar issues, the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court adopted the reasoning of the dissenting
Justices.

III.

CC v. A.B. :85 THE MASSACHUSETTS SUPREME JUDICIAL
COURT'S VIEW OF THE PUTATIVE FATHER'S RIGHT TO
STANDING TO REBUT THE MARITAL
PRESUMPTION OF LEGITIMACY

In 1990, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court was faced
with a case factually similar to Michael H. Contrary to the United
States Supreme Court's decision in Michael H., the Supreme Judicial
Court held in C C v. A.B. that a putative father was entitled to stand
ing to adjudicate paternity if he could prove in a preliminary hearing
that a substantial relationship existed between him and his child. 86
A.

Facts

C.C. lived with the mother, A.B., during the time that A.B. was
82. Id. at 162.
83. See supra note 45 for a discussion of the relevant cases.
84. 550 N.E.2d 365 (Mass. 1990).
85. Id. For a brief overview of this case, see Phyllis T. Baumann, Evidence
Paternity-Presumption of Legitimacy, 75 MASS. L. REV. 82 (1990); Gary E. Mastin, A
Departure from Tradition: The Supreme Judicial Court Rebuts the Presumption of a
.
Husband's Paternity, 8 MASS. FAM. L.J. 113, 117-19 (1991).
86. e.e., 550 N.E.2d at 372-73.·
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estranged from her husband. A child was conceived and born during
this period of cohabitation. 87 At birth, C.C.'s surname and a deriva
tion of his middle name were given to the child. C.C. was listed as the
father on the child's birth certificate and baptismal record. Until the
termination of his relationship with A.B., C.C. claimed that he "cared
for"88 the child. C.C. filed a complaint alleging that he was the biolog
ical father of the child. He asserted a right to adjudicate his paternity
and a fundamental right to maintain a relationship with his child. 89
A.B. acknowledged that C.C. could be the child's father. Follow
ing the termination of A.B. and C.C.'s relationship, A.B. filed a cus
tody and child support proceeding against C.C.90 However, at the
time of this action, A.B. had reconciled with her husband and with
drawn the custody and support proceedings. 91
B.

The Majority Opinion Granting Standing to a Putative Father to
Rebut the Marital Presumption of Legitimacy

The Supreme Judicial Court recognized that a putative father has
a protected interest in maintaining a developed relationship with his
child. The court based its decision on an examination of the statutes
under which the paternity suit was filed, the common law approaches
87. Id. at 367.
88. Id. The child was born May 19, 1986 and was baptized October 27, 1986. Id.
The case does not specify the length of time that C.C. and A.B. cohabited.
89. !d. The complaint was filed under the General Laws of the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts (hereinafter Massachusetts General Law) chapter 209C, § 5(a) (1988),
which states in relevant part:
(a) Complaints under this chapter to establish paternity, support, visitation or
custody of a child may be commenced by the mother, whether a minor or not; by
a person presumed to be or alleging himself to be the father, whether a minor or
not; by the child; by the child's guardian, next of kin, or other person standing in
a parental relation to the child; by the parent or personal representative of the
mother if the mother has died or has abandoned the child; by the parent or per
sonal representative of the father if the father has died; by the authorized agent of
the department of social services or any agency licensed under chapter twenty
eight A provided that the child is in their custody; or, if the child is or was a
recipient of any type of public assistance, by the department of public welfare;
provided, however, that if the mother of the child was or is married and the
child's birth occurs during the marriage or within three hundred days of its termi
nation by death, annulment or divorce, complaints under this chapter may not be
filed by a person presumed to be or alleging himself to be the father unless he is or
was the mother's husband at the time of the child's birth or conception.
MASS. GEN. L. ch. 209C, § 5(a) (1988) (emphasis added).
90. C. c., 550 N .E.2d at 367.
91. Id. The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for direct appellate re
view after the probate court judge reported the case to the appeals court. The case was
heard on September 13, 1989, and decided on February 21, 1990. Id. at 365, 367.
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to the presumption of legitimacy, and the constitutional cases which
established that a putative father has a protected interest if a parent
child relationship exists.
1.

Statutory Analysis: The Purpose and Effect of
Massachusetts General Law chapter 209C, Section
5(a)92

The court, in an opinion authored by Justice Nolan, initially con
sidered the terms of the statute under which the suit was filed. The
statute's purpose was to establish a means for children born out of
wedlock to be acknowledged by their parents. 93 This provision con
tains a number of exclusions, one of which pertains to those situations
in which the mother of the child "was or is married and the child's
birth occurs during the marriage or within three hundred days of its
termination."94 This provision does not allow standing to adjudicate
paternity by one alleging himself to be the father "unless he is or was
the mother's husband at the time of the child's birth or conception."9s
C.C. alleged that the exclusion was unconstitutional. However, the
court pointed out that "[i]n our view, G.L. c. 209C, § 5 (a), does not
abrogate or modify a putative father's right, as established by prior
cases of this court, to bring a complaint to establish paternity under
the general equity jurisdiction of the Probate Court."96
The court held that although chapter 209C section 5(a) bars a
putative father from bringing an action under this chapter, section 5(a)
does not limit a putative father's rights to proceed under the general
equity jurisdiction of Massachusetts General Law chapter 215, section
6. 97 The court distinguished other Massachusetts statutes to deter
92.
89.

For the text of Massachusetts General Law chapter 209C, § 5(a), see supra note

e.e., 550 N.E.2d at 368.
Id.
95. Id. (quoting MASS. GEN. L. ch. 209C, § 5(a) (1986». See supra note 89 for the
current version of this statute.
96. e.e., 550 N.E.2d at 368. Chapter 209C § 5(a) limits the persons who may sue
under this section to "the mother, the alleged father, the child, a person legally standing in
the place of a parent or the child, or certain governmental agencies providing financial
support or foster care." Brief for Appellant at 10, c.c. v. A.B., 550 N.E.2d 365 (Mass.
1990) (No. 5134). If the mother were married at the time of the child's birth or conception,
no man other than her then existing husband may sue under this section. Id. at 11. As the
court correctly stated, the language of the statute does not preclude a putative father from
filing suit under the general equity provision. For the language of the statute, see supra
note 89; for the general equity provision, see infra note 97.
97. e.e., 550 N.E.2d at 368. Massachusetts General Law chapter 215 § 6 provides
in relevant part: "The probate and family court department shall have original and concur
rent jurisdiction with the supreme judicial court and the superior court department of all
93.
94.
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mine generally the rights of putative fathers. 98 As a result, it recog
nized that, consistent with other Massachusetts statutes permitting
paternity actions, a putative father was not summarily foreclosed from
bringing a paternity action because there were opportunities available
through other statutory mechanisms. Having decided that a putative
father was not procedurally barred from filing a paternity action, the
court turned to a substantive analysis to determine in what circum
stances the putative father should be granted standing.
2.

Substantive Analysis: The Presumption of Legitimacy

Following an in-depth examination of the origin and purpose of
the presumption of legitimacy 99 and the standard used to rebut it, 100
cases and matters of general equity cognizable under the general principles of equity juris
prudence and, with reference thereto, shall be the courts of general equity jurisdiction
...." MASS. GEN. L. ch. 215 § 6 (1988).
98. e. e., 550 N.E.2d at 372. Justice Nolan cited the following Massachusetts stat
utes which allow paternity actions: MASS. GEN. L. ch. 209C (1986) (effectively eliminating
the presumption of legitimacy); MASS. GEN. L. ch. 209C, § 5(a) (1986) (stating that a
married woman may bring action to establish paternity against a man other than her hus
band); MASS. GEN. L. ch. 209C, § 7 (1986) (requiring that the married woman bringing
action under chapter 209C, § 5(a) prove paternity by clear and convincing evidence);
MASS. GEN. L. ch. 209C, § 5(a) (1986) (permitting the Department of Public Welfare to
bring a paternity action against a man other than the husband if the child is or was a
recipient of assistance, and if proof is by clear and convincing evidence under § 7); MASS.
GEN L. ch. 209C, § 16 (1986) (permitting both a married woman and her husband to
testify to non-access during the relevant period oftime). Id. at 371. With these statutes as
a background, Justice Nolan concluded that "the common law should move forward."
e.e., 550 N.E.2d at 371-72.
99. e.e., 550 N.E.2d at 367-72. The presumption evolved from one that was conclu
sive to one that could be rebutted by proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the husband
could not be the father. The conditions to be proven are that: "(1) the husband had no
access to the wife during the time of possible conception; (2) the husband was impotent; or
(3) a properly conducted blood grouping test, administered by a qualified expert, defini
tively excludes the husband as a father." In re J.S.V., 524 N.E.2d 826,827-28 (Mass. 1988)
(denying standing to adjudicate paternity to a putative father who offered no facts to over
come the presumption of legitimacy, in the context of a proceeding to dispense with the
need for parental consent to adoption). Justice Nolan abrogated Lord Mansfield's Rule
concerning the husband's or wife's incompetence to testify to non-access. e. e., 550 N.E.2d
at 371. See also supra text accompanying notes 30-45.
100. e.e, 550 N.E.2d at 370 (citing Normand v. Barkei, 434 N.E.2d 631 (Mass.
1982); Gardner v. Rothman, 345 N.E.2d 370 (Mass. 1976».
In 1987, the Supreme Judicial Court used the substantial relationship test to decide the
case of R.R.K. v. S.G.P., 507 N.E.2d 736 (Mass. 1987). In this case, a putative father
sought visitation rights to his child who was conceived during the mother's marriage to
another. Id. at 737. After blood tests of the putative father, mother and child, limited
visitation rights were granted to the putative father. Id. The putative father also was or
dered to pay support. Id. The mother filed a motion to dismiss the paternity suit because
of lack of standing. Id. Because the father and child had developed a relationship, the
court remanded the case for findings beyond a reasonable doubt that R.R.K. was the father
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the court reduced the case to one succinct issue: the conflict between
the interest of the unwed putative father, C.C., and the interests of the
state in preserving the legitimacy of the child. The court continued to
adhere to the principle of the presumption of legitimacy and the strong
interest in legitimizing children. 101 However, the court stated that the
presumption of legitimacy no longer required rebuttal by facts beyond
a reasonable doubt. Instead, the court established a new standard
which would preserve the interests of those involved "by requiring
that a putative father in the plaintiff's position be required to prove
paternity by clear and convincing evidence."102 According to the
court, because the putative father deserved greater recognition, a bet
ter allocation of the risks of error was necessary. A clear and convinc
ing evidentiary standard would serve the purpose of affording
legitimacy to the child while at the same time recognizing the putative
father's interest. I03
The court then focused on the evidentiary proof of paternity. The
common law approach to the presumption of legitimacy prevented a
court from reaching the issue of paternity because the child was pre
sumed to be the husband's child. However, because of advancements
in scientific technology, determinations of paternity have been ren
dered more accurate. Therefore, the court reasoned that the putative
father should be allowed to produce evidence of his paternity. Ac
cording to the court, the prior standard, which required proof beyond
a reasonable doubt of the husband's impotence, non-access, or exclu
sion as the father, could no longer be justified. These factors, the court
stated, remain relevant to the issue of the putative father's biological
status, but are not dispositive. I04
The court maintained that, in a factual situation similar to this
case, a putative father is entitled to bring an action to establish p~ter
nity pursuant to the general equity provision of Massachusetts Gen
of the child. Id. at 737-38. The court distinguished the facts from those in P.B.C. v. D.H.,
483 N.E.2d 1094 (Mass. 1985), a case in which the Supreme Judicial Court found that no
parent-child relationship existed thereby justifying the denial of standing. R.R.K., 507
N.E.2d at 737.
101. c.c., 550 N.E.2d at 370.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. See also Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 140-41 (1989) (Brennan,
J., dissenting, joined by Marshall & Blackmun, JJ.). Justice Brennan stated:
[T]he original reasons for the conclusive presumption of paternity are out of place
in a world in which blood tests can prove virtually beyond a shadow of a doubt
who sired a particular child and in which the fact of illegitimacy no longer plays
the burdensome and stigmatizing role it once did.
Id. at 140.
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eral Law chapter 215, section 6.105 Because C.C. had developed a
substantial relationship with his child, the court ruled that C.C.
should be allowed to pursue a paternity action. I06 The court con
cluded that the existence of a substantial parent-child relationship "is
an appropriate prerequisite for the commencement of an action such
as this."107
Thus, the court held that when a putative father asserts a pater
nity suit, the probate court must hold a preliminary hearing to deter
mine the extent of the relationship between putative father and
child. !Os This question is fact based, and, consequently, certain factors
must be considered by the court in examining the relationship. 109
According to the court in C C. , establishing a substantial parent
child relationship protects the marital unit from intrusion. 110 The
court noted that a paternity action places a "strain" on the marital
unit. Therefore, to preserve the state's interest, in the absence of clear
and convincing evidence of a substantial father-child relationship, the
putative father should not be allowed to proceed with his claim be
yond a preliminary hearing. However, the existence of a substantial
relationship is evidence that the family unit has already suffered inter
ference. The court reasoned that, where a substantial relationship ex
ists, the burden on the family is minimized and the importance of the
state's interest is lessened. Consequently, the putative father should be
permitted to pursue a paternity action. III
105. c.c., 550 N.E.2d at 372. For the relevant text of chapter 215, § 6, see supra
note 97.
106. c.c., 550 N.E.2d at 372.
107. Id. In making this decision the court also relied on the United States Supreme
Court cases that established a putative father's right to adjudicate paternity if a parent
child relationship existed. For a discussion of these cases, see supra note 45; see also infra
text accompanying notes 129- 40.
108. Id.
109. Id.; see infra notes 118-23 and accompanying text.
IlO. c.c., 550 N.E.2d at 372-73.
111. Id. Because of this holding, it was unnecessary for the court to address the
issue of Massachusetts General Law chapter 209C, § 5(a), and C.Co's denial of due process.
Justice Nolan also did not address the issue of what further rights a putative father would
have if he were able to prove that a substantial relationship did exist between himself and
his child. That determination would depend on the best interests of the child. Id. at 373.
The court limited its decision to the conclusion that C.C. "should be given the opportunity
to prove paternity," and the case was remanded to the probate court. Id. A.Bo's motion to
di~miss the action was denied. Id.
Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice Lynch, dissented on two grounds. First, Justice
O'Connor asserted that the majority misapplied the substantial relationship test. Second,
he maintained that the decision created an inconsistency between the stated policy and
legislative mandate of chapter 209C. Id. at 373.
Justice O'Connor stated that the substantial relationship test is important when a child
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THE SUBSTANTIAL RELATIONSHIP TEST: ACQUIRING
STANDING TO REBUT THE PRESUMPTION OF
LEGITIMACY

Although the United States Supreme Court and the Massachu
setts Supreme Judicial Court analyzed factually similar cases, their
conclusions are markedly different. The distinguishing feature be
tween the decisions is the establishment by the Supreme Judicial Court
of a procedure enabling a natural father to gain standing to rebut the
presumption of legitimacy. The Supreme Judicial Court took a more
realistic approach by recognizing that a developed parent-child rela
tionship acknowledged the interests of the putative father and caused
only minimal intrusion on the family unit.
The difference between allowing or denying a putative father
standing to rebut the marital presumption lies in the interpretation
given to prior cases. The United States Supreme Court analyzed ear
lier cases dealing with putative fathers' rights and concluded that
those cases were distinguishable because the parties were unwed and
the marital presumption was not an issue. 112 The Supreme Judicial
Court, on the other hand, analyzed these same cases and found that
is born out of wedlock to an unmarried mother. However, the reasoning is different when a
child is born to a married woman. The dissent stated:
Because the "unitary family" accorded traditional respect may include the puta
tive father, mother, and child born out of wedlock, but does not include the
mother, child born in wedlock, and the mother's lover, the substantial parent
child relationship test applicable in the former context has no relevancy to the
latter either as a matter of constitutional analysis or for policy formation
purposes.
Id. at 374-75.
For several reasons, Justice O'Connor believed the majority misapplied the use of the
substantial relationship test. First, the holding of Michael H. clearly stated that a putative
father in C.C.'s position "does not have a constitutionally protected interest in obtaining an
adjudication that he is the father of the child." Id. at 375. Justice O'Connor conceded that
the majority did not claim that C.c. did have such a right. Id. Second, he maintained that
the majority wrongly decided, "as a matter of judicially declared policy (common law),"
that a putative father is entitled to a paternity adjudication if a substantial parent-child
relationship can be demonstrated. Id.
Justice O'Connor argued that the court also erred in establishing a new policy that was
contrary to the legislative mandate as established by the enactment of chapter 209C, pre
cluding a putative father from standing to adjudicate paternity. He noted that the social
policy motivating the passage of this statute was the protection of the unitary family which
included a mother, her husband, and her child. This provision foreclosed a putative father
in C.C. 's position from attacking both the family's harmony and the legitimacy of the child.
Id. Consistent with the United States Supreme Court ruling in Michael H., and Massachu
setts legislative mandate and interests, he stated that a putative father should not have
standing to adjudicate paternity if the child were conceived by and born to a married wo
man. Id. at 376.
112. See supra note 45.
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they manifested an evolution of the rights granted to putative fathers
in general.!!3 The court concluded, therefore, that to allow putative
fathers the opportunity to rebut the presumption of legitimacy was
only one more step in that evolutionary process.
Consequently, the Supreme Judicial Court found a mechanism
through which a putative father could be granted standing. By using
the general equity jurisdiction of the probate court under Massachu
setts General Law chapter 215, section 6,114 the court paved the way
for a putative father to establish paternity. In an attempt to maintain
the interests of the state in legitimizing children and protecting the
family from intrusion, it established the substantial relationship
test. liS
If the United States Supreme Court had used this same reasoning
in examining the statutes at issue in Michael H., Michael would have
been able to enter the preliminary stages of a paternity adjudication.
Consequently, if he successfully proved the existence of a developed
relationship with Victoria, lIe would be allowed to pursue his claim.
Furthermore, the California court would be less likely to deny him
visitation rights unless these were not in the best interests of his
child. 116
Unlike the United States Supreme Court, the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court recognized in the general equity statute a pro
cedural loophole for putative fathers who faced the marital presump
tion. The court justified this equitable avenue for putative fathers
based on substantive arguments that recognized the substantial rela
tionship test as a preliminary inquiry into granting putative fathers'
claims.!!7
113. C.C, 550 N.E.2d at 370.
114. Id. at 372. For the relevant text of Massachusetts General Law chapter 215,
§ 6, see supra note 97.
115. CC, 550 N.E.2d at 372.
116. Justice Stevens reasoned that Michael had proven a developed relationship with
Victoria, and although he was precluded from asserting paternity under California Evi
dence Code § 621, he could prove that he was an interested party under California Civil
Code § 4601. For discussions and the relevant parts of §§ 621 and 4601, see supra notes
48-49, 56 respectively. The court would examine whether visitation was in the best inter
ests of the child and grant or deny the visitation petition. The trial judge took this ap
proach and found that "the existence of two (2) 'fathers' as male authority figures will
confuse the child and be counter-productive to her best interests." Michael H. v. Gerald
D., 491 U.S. 110, 135 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting Michael H. v. Gerald D.,
236 Cal. Rptr. 810, 821 (Ct. App. 1987»; see also Batty, supra note 47, at 1202.
117. See supra notes 30 and 45 for a discussion of the relevant Massachusetts and
United States Supreme Court cases dealing with putative fathers and the substantial rela
tionship issue.
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The Massachusetts Test

The substantial relationship test adopted by the Supreme Judicial
Court acknowledges changes in American lifestyles. I 18 Furthermore,
it recognizes the interests of a putative father in maintaining a rela
tionship with his child; it creates minimal intrusion because a devel
oped relationship may be evidence that the family is aware of the
circumstances of the child's birth; and it addresses the need to afford
legitimacy to the child and minimizes the p~ychological damage re
sulting from a paternity adjudication.
In a preliminary stage, the putative father must prove by clear
and convincing evidence that a substantial parent-child relationship
exists between himself and the child. 119 This test balances the natural
father's interest in maintaining a parent-child relationship with the
state's interests in affording legitimacy to children and protecting the
marital family from intrusion.
The court chose a test which is fact-based. 120 It instructed the
probate court to "look at the relationship as a whole." 121 In doing so,
the court must consider "emotional bonds, economic support, custody
of the child, the extent of personal association, the commitment of the
putative father to attending to the child's needs, the consistency of the
putative father's expressed interest, the child's name, [and] the names
listed on the birth certificate."122 Along with this objective evidence,
the court has the discretion to consider "any other factors which bear
on the nature of the alleged parent-child relationship."123
118. See generally Batty, supra note 47, at 1203 ("The number of 'illegitimate' births,
as a percentage of all births, increased from 5.3% in 1960 to 22% in 1985."); Vincent A.
Errante, Jr., Note, Putative Fathers and Ganim v. Roberts: A Fundamental Right?, 3
CoNN. PROB. L.J. 417, 417-24 (1988) (providing statistics indicating the steadily increasing
numbers of illegitimate children being born in the United States in recent years). Nation
wide, between 1980 and 1983, the number of out of wedlock births rose from 18.4% to
20%. SIDNEY B. SCHATKIN, DISPUTED PATERNITY PROCEEDINGS § 27.01 (1991).
119. CC., 550 N.E.2d at 373. It must be noted that a putative father without a
developed parent-child relationship will gain no access to the courts under the Massachu
setts standard, and will be left in the same position as Michael H. A putative father who
wishes to establish a parent-child relationship may be precluded from doing so by the
mother. Thus, the will of the mother may foreclose a putative father from adjudicating
paternity. Under this scenario, the result is the same under both the Michael H. and C C
standards. See also Mary K. Kisthardt, OfFatherhood. Families and Fantasy: The Legacy
of Michael H. v. Gerald D., 65 TuL. L. REV. 585, 626 (1991).
120. CC, 550 N.E.2d at 372.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. For a guide to the filing of paternity actions consistent with the C C stan
dard, see generally Robert E. Hanlon, Paternity Cases Filed in Equity, 8 MASS. B. AsS'N
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B. Application of the Test
The court applied the substantial relationship test in evaluating
C.C.'s assertion. The distinguishing features of C.C.'s claim show that
his position as biological parent is enhanced by significant factors. He
is the named father on the child's birth certificate and baptismal rec
ord; the mother, child, and C.C. lived together after the child's birth;
and the child has a derivation of his name. 124 The filing of his pater
nity action exhibits his desire to continue to maintain and foster a rela
tionship with the child.
The Supreme Judicial Court's standard distinguished Massachu
setts precedent which denied putative fathers standing to adjudicate
paternity because of the non-existence of a parent-child relation
ship.125 The existence of such a relationship is "the controlling factor
in determining whether this plaintiff may pursue his claim,"126 be
cause the putative father is seeking to renew a developed parent-child
relationship of which he was deprived. 127 Due process is necessary
SEC. YOUNG LAW. DIVISION 5 (1991) (citing ALFRED L. PODOLSKI, GUIDELINE PROCE
DURES FOR PATERNITY ACTIONS FILED IN EQUITY (1990».
124. c.c., 550 N.E.2d at 372.
125. Id. Standing will be denied if there is no evidence of the existence of a parent
child relationship.
126. Id.
127. Id. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court affirmed its position in two sub
sequent decisions. In November 1990, the Supreme Judicial Court found that the absence
of a substantial parent-child relationship barred the putative father from asserting his pa
ternity. In re Walter, 562 N.E.2d 474 (Mass. 1990). In Walter, the Supreme Judicial
Court upheld a lower court's denial of a motion filed by the Boston Children's Legal Serv
ices Association to compel the husband to submit to blood tests. In this case, the mother
conceived and gave birth to a child during her marriage. Id. at 475. One day after the
child's birth, she placed the child for adoption. She claimed that her husband was not the
biological father although she listed him as the father on the birth certificate. Id. Because
the husband had asserted his parental rights to the child and the putative father did not
have any relationship with the child, the court upheld the husband's challenge to the adop
tion and the denial of the putative father's paternity claim. Id. at 476-77. Although this
case appears to be a return to the presumption of legitimacy established by Massachusetts
General Law chapter 209C, upon closer examination the decision does not supersede the
holding of c.c. In a case such as Walter, no developed relationship existed between the
biological father and the child nor the "legal" father (the husband) and the child. To be
consistent with the purpose of 209C which affords "out of wedlock children" an opportu
nity to be "legitimized," the court upheld the husband's status as father.
In June 1991, the court rejected a putative father's action to establish paternity be
cause of the absence of a substantial relationship. In M.J.C. v. D.J., 572 N.E.2d 562 (Mass.
1991), the putative father of a child born to a woman who was married to someone else at
the time of the child's conception and birth sought to establish paternity. Approximately
two weeks to four months after the child's birth, the putative father visited the mother and
child two or three times a week staying an average of ninety minutes each visit. Id. at 563
64. Although the child remained in the room during the first two months of these visits,
during the last two months the child usually slept in a second floor bedroom and the puta
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because the unwed biological father has an interest in furthering a de
veloped relationship with his child. 128
The substantial relationship test balances all interests involved
and creates an equitable standard for all parties. It gives the putative
father an opportunity to assert paternity and maintains the state's in
terests in protecting the marital family and in affording the child
legitimacy.
Although the Supreme Judicial Court stated that all interests are
adequately protected, in order to determine whether the substantial
relationship test performs its intended purpose, the interests of all the
parties must be identified and independently evaluated.
1.

The Interests of the Biological Father

The putative father's protected interest is the right to maintain a
relationship with his child. The interests of unwed fathers are estab
lished in a line of Supreme Court cases beginning with Stanley v. Illi
nois .129 In this custody case, an unwed father sought due process
protection from a denial of a hearing on fitness. The Supreme Court
declared: "The private interest here, that of a man in the children he
has sired and raised, undeniably warrants deference and, absent a
powerful countervailing interest, protection."130 In a subsequent case,
in which the Supreme Court examined these interests, Justice Stewart
wrote in his dissenting opinion that "[p]arental rights do not spring
full blown from the biological connection between parent and child.
They require relationships more enduring."l3l Thus, a man may ac
quire constitutional protection if he has developed a sufficient relation
ship between himself and his child.
tive father often left without seeing the child. After four months, the mother ended these
visits and refused to allow the putative father to have further contact with her and her
child. Id. at 564. The woman's husband treated the child as his and, for the first four
months, was unaware that there was a possibility that the child might not be his. Id. After
reviewing these facts, the court found that the putative father had developed no relation
ship with the child, and that any contact with the child during the visits was motivated by
his desire to.be with the mother. Id. at 565. The court rejected the putative father's con
tention that he was prevented by the mother's actions from developing a relationship with
the child. Id. at 565. Instead, the court recognized this situation as the type "contem
plated by c.c. v. A.B., in which the putative father's interest is not strong enough to war
rant protection, and the family unit has not already been weakened enough to warrant
intrusion." Id. at 565 n.2.
128. c.c., 550 N.E.2d at 372 (citing Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 261 (1983».
129. 405 U.S. 645 (1972). See supra note 45.
130. Id. at 651.
131. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 397 (1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting). See
supra note 45.

102

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 14:79

Unlike the putative father, the mother's relationship to her child
is clear.
She carries and bears the child . . . . The "alidity of the father's
parental claims must be gauged by other measures. By tradition,
the primary measure has been the legitimate familial relationship he
creates with the child by marriage with the mother.... In some
circumstances the actual relationship between father and child may
suffice to create in the unwed father parental interests comparable
to those of the married father. 132

The Supreme Court agreed that "a biological link does not merit
equivalent constitutional protection."133 This link creates an opportu
nity to accept the responsibility for the child while enjoying the paren
tal relationship. However, if the biological father does not seize the
opportunity, the Constitution will not grant him one.134
The dissenting Justices 135 in Caban v. Mohammed 136 noted that
the biological father who develops a relationship with his child is enti
tled to protection against arbitrary state action.137 In Quilloin v.
Walcott,138 Quilloin was denied his opportunity to object to the adop
tion of his child, because, although he paid child support, "he ha[d]
never exercised actual or legal custody over his child, and thus ha[d]
never shouldered any significant responsibility with respect to the
daily supervision, education, protection, or care of the child." 139 Quil
loin had no desire to seek custody nor to complain about his lack of
access to the child. Consequently, on the basis of the nonexistence of
any parent-child relationship, the Court found that Quilloin had no
constitutionally protected interest. l40
These cases, as well as those decided by the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court, turn on the existence of a parent-child rela
tionship and suggest that this relationship is the governing factor.141
132. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 260 n.16 (1983) (quoting Caban v. Moham
med, 441 U.S. 380, 397 (1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting». See supra note 45.
133. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 261.
134. Id. at 262.
135. Four Justices dissented. Justice Stewart wrote a dissenting opinion. Caban v.
Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 394 (1979). Justice Stevens filed a separate, dissenting opinion
in which Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist joined. Id. at 401.
136. 441 U.S. 380 (1979). For a discussion of this case, see supra note 45.
137. Id. at 392-94.
138. 434 U.S. 246 (1978). For a discussion of this case, see supra note 45.
139. Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 256.
140. Id.
141. Batty, supra note 47, at 1201. "The Stanley line of cases stands for the proposi
tion that once a putative father has developed a parental relationship, that relationship
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If the father has not developed an association with his child, he is
estopped from asserting paternity. The opportunity given to attain
standing to rebut the presumption of legitimacy in this preliminary
hearing preserves the putative father's interest if he takes the initiative
to establish a relationship with his child from the child's birth.
2.

The Interests of the State

Even if the parent-child relationship exists, in order for the sub
stantial relationship standard to accomplish its purpose, it must con
sider not only the putative father's interests but those of the state as
well. According to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, the
Commonwealth has a twofold interest. 142 The state must protect the
privacy interests of the marital family against intrusion and preserve
the legitimacy of the child.
Despite numerous changes in the family unit's composition as a
result of current lifestyles, the Commonwealth maintained that "[t]he
traditional family unit is at the core of our society."143 The United
States Supreme Court acknowledged that substantial disruption of the
marital family may result from a paternity claim. This strain is what
the plurality in Michael H. attempted to prevent. However, the
Supreme Judicial Court concluded that if a plaintiff can prove that a
substantial parent-child relationship exists, the marital family will
have anticipated the claim of paternity.l44 Nonetheless, the state's in
terests in protecting the mother's and her husband's interests must be
weighed against those of the putative father.
The mother's interest is to protect her family and marriage. A
paternity suit, even in a preliminary stage, places a strain on the family
in general and the marriage in particular because it is a reminder of a
former relationship and may threaten the mother's relationship with
her husband. 145 As a result of this increased tension, the relationship
between the mother and child may also suffer. l46 More importantly,
the mother may be concerned that the results of a paternity suit would
stigmatize the child. 147 If the putative father succeeds in his suit and
deserves constitutional protection. Thus, Justice Scalia's opinion is inconsistent with the
Court's own precedent." Id. (footnote omitted). See supra notes 30, 45.
142. C.C. v. A.B., 550 N.E.2d 365, 370, 373 (Mass. 1990).
143. Id. at 373.
144. Id.
145. Meiners, supra note 30, at 1226. For a discussion of a mother's rights and
duties see CLARK, supra note 1, § 4.5 at 197-201; KRAUSE, supra note 14, at 28-29.
146.° Id.
147. Id. In effect, the child would be considered illegitimate. Id.
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eventually gains visitation rights, the court will gain supervisory con
trol over the parent-child relationship.148 Even if in the past the
mother allowed the putative father to visit the child, she was able to
control the extent of the intrusion on her family.149 A successful pa
ternity suit would place control of visitation in the courts, leaving the
mother with court imposed compliance. ISO
The husband's interests are similar to those of the mother. The
husband also wishes to maintain his family's privacy and protect his
relationship from the reminder of a past transgression. In addition, a
successful paternity suit can create two disturbing results: either the
husband is left without paternal status as if he had disavowed pater
nity, or he, as legal father, will share dual paternity with the biological
father in an unclear division of obligations and rights. lSI
The interests of both the mother and her husband must be pro
tected. If a putative father has developed a substantial relationship
with his child, the husband may already know that there is a possibil
ity that the child is not his. Thus, the chances of intruding on an
apparently intact marriage and harmonious family life are minimized.
Conversely, if the putative father is unable to meet his burden of proof,
his paternity suit will be denied and no further intrusion will occur.
When a putative father asserts paternity of a child born into a
marital family and the husband is aware of the putative father's exist
ence, the intrusion on the marital family is minimal. Justice Scalia
recognized that "it is more likely that the husband already knows the
child is not his, and thus less likely that the paternity hearing will
disrupt an otherwise harmonious and apparently exclusive marital re
lationship."ls2 Ironically, this argument supports the Supreme Judi
cial Court's conclusion.
To minimize further intrusion, the substantial relationship test
looks more realistically at all relevant circumstances. The factors uti
lized are objective and can often be proven with documentation such
as birth certificates and derivative names. It is likely that if any of the
enumerated factors exists, the husband will be aware of the extant cir
cumstances surrounding the child's birth and will not be shocked by
the proceedings. Granting the putative father a preliminary hearing to
148.
149.

Id.
Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 120 n.l (1989) (Scalia, J., wrote for the
plurality joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and, in all but note 6, by O'Connor & Kennedy, JJ. Id.
at 113-32; see supra note 5).
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prove the existence of a substantial parent-child relationship is less in
trusive on the family and preserves the state's interests. IS3
The second state interest is to afford legitimacy to children. Both
statutes and the common law reflect society's view that "discrimina
tion against illegitimate children is not justified."ls4 The Common
wealth's enactment of Massachusetts General Law chapter 209C
contemplates removing the stigma of illegitimacy and granting to chil
dren the same rights which all children possess. ISS The evidence
needed to verify the substantial relationship test creates minimal in
fringement on the child and the child's legitimacy.
3.

The Interests of the Child

The substantial relationship test recognizes not only the need to
afford legitimacy to the child, but also the best interests of the child. If
a relationship exists between the putative father and his child, denying
the putative father access to the child contradicts the state's purpose.
Most experts agree that a child needs continuity in intimate relation
ships.ls6 When a child is separated from someone with whom the
child has developed a relationship, the child's ability to form attach
ments is damaged. IS7 The substantial relationship test seeks to mini
mize this damage by allowing a putative father the opportunity to
prove an established relationship. Although having two "fathers"
may confuse the child, this argument is shortsighted. ISS It fails to con
sider that a child has developed a relationship outside of the marital
153. If the putative father is able to sustain his burden of proof at this preliminary
stage, he will attain standing to assert a paternity claim. The Supreme Judicial Court low
ered the burden of proof of paternity to "clear and convincing evidence." C.c. v. A.B., 550
N.E.2d 365, 370 (Mass. 1990). Because of the accepted use of blood tests to establish
paternity, an intrusion into the private lives of the parties is not necessary. Though the
court abrogated Lord Mansfield's Rule and gave the husband and wife the opportunity to
testify to non-access and impotency, such testimony is not necessary. A blood test is a far
more convincing fact. The Human Leukocyte Antigen ("HLA") blood test is recognized
as "the most precise method for accurately determining paternity. It is generally accepted
that the HLA test, when used in conjunction with other tests, can establish as high as a 99
percent probability that a particular man is, in fact, the biological father of a particular
child." See SCHATKIN, supra note 118, § llA.Ol. The accuracy of a blood test combined
with the lower evidentiary standard allows a court to determine paternity without the need
for evidence as to infidelity or impotency.
154. CC, 550 N.E.2d at 369.
155. Id. at 370.
156. Katharine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status: The Need
for Legal Alternatives When the Premise of the Nuclear Family has Failed, 70 VA. L. REV.
879,944 (1984); see also Kisthardt, supra note 119, at 630-31 (1991).
157. Bartlett, supra note 156, at 903.
158. Id. at 882.
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family. It also fails to consider the similarities between the putative
father's situation and that of natural parents who have been separated
from their children through divorce.
A child's sense of security is established through a knowledge of
her past. 1S9 A child that has developed a relationship with her puta
tive natural father and who is subsequently separated from him is
likely to suffer the same problems as children who are separated from
their parents. In cases in which a child is separated from a parent with
whom she has a developed relationship, unrealistic ideas or fantasies
replace reality, only offering the child temporary help and creating an
improper foundation for the "resolution oflOSS."I60 A child's identity
develops better when she is allowed to continue her relationship with
her parent. 161 Although loyalty confusion can result from the contin
ued existence of dual paternity, experts say that dissolving these bonds
may cause greater harm. In fact, those children who maintain these
concurrent relationships appear to adjust more easily.162
The substantial relationship test also considers the opposing view
point that a child could be psychologically damaged by a paternity
adjudication. By allowing only those fathers with established relation
ships to acquire standing, the test considers the detriment to the child
of having paternity asserted by a virtual stranger. If a putative father
has not established a relationship with his child, he would be an in
truder in the child's life. The absence of an individual with whom no
developeq relationship exists, creates no noticeable difference in the
life of a young child whose sense of time causes memories to weaken
within a few days.163 Genetics does not create "an emotional attach
ment"l64 and the putative father relying solely on his paternity is an
intruder against whom the state must provide protection. The test af
fords that protection. 16S
Id. at 910.
Id. at 906.
Id.
Id. at 908-11 (citing JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTER
ESTS OF THE CHILD (1979) and Judith S. Wallerstein and Joan B. Kelly, The Effects of
Parental Divorce: Experiences ofthe Child in Later Latency, 46 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY
256 (1976)).
163. Traci Dallas,.Note, Rebutting the Marital Presumption: A Developed Relation
ship Test, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 369, 385 n.94 (1988).
164. Id. at 376-78.
165. It must be remembered that this test simply grants the putative father a prelimi
nary hearing. At this stage, no serious intrusion on the child's legitimacy occurs. If the
putative father sustains his burden of proof at this level, he will be granted standing to
rebut the marital presumption. The court did not deal with the ramifications of the puta
tive father's success at this level. C.c. v. A.B., 550 N.E.2d 365, 373 (Mass. 1990).
159.
160.
161.
162.
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The substantial relationship test protects the interests of putative
fathers seeking to maintain parental relationships with their children.
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court reconciled the problem of
a putative father seeking to rebut the marital presumption of legiti
macy and establish paternity. In doing so, it recognized the benefit of
preserving the parent-child relationship and acknowledged that
"parenthood is not based solely on a biological connection."166 The
court removed legal barriers which summarily denied these men an
opportunity to maintain such a tie. The elimination of these impedi
ments balances all of the state's interests at this preliminary level.
However, acquisition of standing creates consequences which must be
addressed.
Parental responsibility arises when paternity is affirmed. Ques
tions of child support and the possibility of custody battles must be
considered by the court. Although proving the existence of a substan
tial parent-child relationship may not be a significant intrusion on the
family, subsequent proceedings are potentially intrusive. Further
more, the biological father may face a charge of adultery. 167 Whether
or not courts will grant visitation to these fathers remains an unan
swered question. 168 Most likely the court will adhere to the "best in
terests of the child" standard to make that determination. 169 .
Even though evidence may establish the existence of a substantial
parent-child relationship, the biological father may be denied the op
portunity to maintain the relationship that he was allowed to prove
because the courts will consider the best interests of the child in hear
ing the putative father's request for visitation. While the court grants
him the opportunity to assert his rights, the putative father must be
willing to face these subsequent obstacles. In recognizing the putative
166. Bartlett, supra note 156, at 924.
167. MASS. GEN. L. ch. 272, § 14 (1988).
168. On the same day that the Supreme Judicial Court decided C C, it decided
R.J.A. v. K.A.V., 550 N.E.2d 376 (Mass. 1990). This case involved a putative father of two
children born to a married woman. The putative father sought to establish his paternity
and to obtain orders for custody, visitation, and child support. Id. at 377. The defendant
moved for dismissal based on Massachusetts General Law chapter 209C, § 5(a) which cre
ated a presumption of legitimacy for children conceived by or born to a married woman
and which denied standing to the putative father. See supra note 89. The court remanded
the case to probate court to seek an adjudication of paternity consistent with the holding of
C C R.J.A., 550 N.E.2d at 377. The court restated its position that Massachusetts Gen
eral Law chapter 209C, § 5(a) does not bar a putative father from commencing a common
law action for a determination of paternity. Id. Justice O'Connor, joined with Justice
Lynch, filed a dissenting opinion consistent with the dissent in CC Id. at 378.
169. C.C. v. A.B., 550 N.E.2d 365,372 (Mass. 1990). This case was remanded to the
probate court for proceedings consistent with the opinion. Id. at 373.
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father's rights, the court reflects its desire to move forward. "The
common law is 'designed to meet and be susceptible of being adapted
"to new institutions and conditions of society ... new usages and prac
tices, as the progress of society in the advancement of civilization may
require.'" "170 The Supreme Judicial Court recognized the role of the
common law in evolving to reflect current societal standards.
Through the substantial relationship test the Supreme Judicial Court
acknowledged its role in tha! evolutionary process.
CONCLUSION

The Supreme Judicial Court took a realistic look at a current
problem. 171 The substantial relationship test adequately balances the
competing interests of the putative father and the state. It is a flexible
test which can be adapted to various circumstances and its objectivity
mitigates intrusion into protected interests. The probate court must
grant a preliminary hearing so that the putative father has the oppor
tunity to establish clear and convincing evidence that a substantial re
lationship with the child exists. If he succeeds, he will acquire
standing to rebut the marital presumption and, if successful, may as
sert his parental prerogatives. However, if he fails, no subsequent ac
tion can be taken. The court recognizes his rights and grants him an
opportunity to be heard.
T. Carmen Loconto

170. c.c., 550 N.E.2d at 371-72 (citations omitted).
171. According to Justice Brennan, the Supreme Court's decision "recognized a
cramped vision of 'the family,' " and did not acknowledge the changing world. Michael H.
v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 157 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by Marshall &
Blackmun, JJ.). He chastised the Court and stated: "When and if the Court awakes to
reality, it will find a world very different from the one it expects." Id. See also Judith O.
Brown & Phyllis T. Baumann, Nostalgia as Constitutional Doctrine: Legalizing Norman
Rockwell's America, 15 VT. L. REV. 49 (1990). "The Supreme Court resorts to another
myth-that of the traditional stereotypical family-to thwart efforts to maintain constitu
tionally protected privacy rights. This myth does not accommodate the reality of personal
relationships or domestic problems of the 1990's." Id. at 58.

